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2Outline
• Intro
• Example of unification effort
o Hamilton’s rule applied to Reciprocal Altruism 
(including mutualisms)
• Example of framework emphasizing role of 
assortment
o Interaction Environments
• Examine claim that only Inclusive Fitness 
explains “true” altruism
o Implications for doing Science with Models
3The Problem
• How can natural selection favor 
individuals that carry helping traits, over 
those that carry selfish ones? 
4Main Theories for the 
Evolution of Altruism
• Multilevel (Group) Selection 
o Altruist dominated groups do better; 
altruists within groups do worse
o ΔQ = ΔQB + ΔQW
• Inclusive Fitness/Kin Selection
o Gene self interest, Hamilton's rule (ΔQ > 0 if rb > c) 
o winclusive = wdirect + windirect
• Reciprocal Altruism 
o Conditional behaviour, Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), 
emphasis on non-relatives, mutualism 
o Indirect reciprocity, strong reciprocity, reciprocity on graphs
• Others
o By-product mutualism, conflict mediators, policing, 
social markets
5Reciprocal Altruism Model
• Interactions modeled as a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game (PD)
• Iterated conditional behaviours
o Genotype (G) no longer determines Phenotype (P)
• Axelrod’s Tournaments (late 1970s on)
o Tit-For-Tat (TFT)
• Anatol Rapoport
• Evolutionary experiments
o Random interactions
o offspring proportional to cumulative payoffs
6Simple Iterated PD Model
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7Axelrod and Hamilton (1981)
• Distinguished two mechanisms
– Inclusive Fitness for relatives
– Reciprocal Altruism for non-relatives
• Why didn’t Hamilton apply Hamilton’s rule?
• Two obstacles for unification
1. Phenotype/Genotype differences
2. PD used is non-additive
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• w0 = 1; b = 4; c = 1; d = -1 (diminishing returns)
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Queller's Generalization
• To solve problem 1 (G/P difference)
o Use phenotypes (behaviours), not just 
genotypes, in Hamilton’s rule
o Hamilton (1975) Queller (1985) 
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• To solve problem 2 (non-additivity)
– Use an additional term to account for 
deviations from additivity (Queller 1985)
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A Simple Mutualism Model
• Interactions are heterospecific and 
pair-wise
• Each species has two types 
o ALLD type
o a cooperative type (e.g. TFT) 
• b, c, d, and the cooperative strategy can 
all vary between species
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There is no general theory of mutualism that 
approaches the explanatory power that 
‘Hamilton’s Rule’ appears to hold for the 
understanding of within-species interactions.
o Herre et al. 1999, TREE 14:49-53
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Back to Basics of Selection
• Queller’s version emphasizes direct fitness; 
no GO term—genotype of Other irrelevant!
• More intuitive form
• An even simpler form
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Outline
• Intro
• Example of unification effort
o Hamilton’s rule applied to Reciprocal Altruism 
(including mutualisms)
• Example of framework emphasizing role of 
assortment
o Interaction Environments
• Examine claim that only Inclusive Fitness 
explains “true” altruism
o Implications for doing Science with Models
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Simple Public Goods Game
• Two types of behaviors
o Cooperate (C) and Defect (D)
• C and D behaviors have simple genetic 
basis
• Interaction environments of N
individuals; split benefits evenly
• C behavior contributes b, at cost c
• b > c  (non-zero-sum-ness)
• D behavior contributes 
nothing and imposes no cost
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Partition Single Interaction Environment
• Within any interaction environment, defectors 
(D) do better than cooperators (C)
• But C can be selected for when 
we consider a whole system of 
interaction environments
• This is the basic dilemma 
of altruism 
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Average Interaction Environment
• A “mean field” approach to social 
interactions
• Let eC and eD be average interaction 
environments of C and D individuals, 
respectively
• Measure eC and eD as the number of C 
behaviors among interaction 
partners (here N-1)
• Compare eC with eD
– Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009. Proceedings B
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Partition Average Interaction Environment
• The condition for C genotype to increase: 
average net payoff to C is greater than 
average net payoff to D
• This is true of any trait!
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Interaction Structures
• Random Binomial Distribution: eC = eD
o Dividing line between weak (b/N > c) and strong 
altruism (b/N < c)
• Over Dispersion: every environment has one C
o eC = 0; eD = 1  (C decreases even if weak: b/N > c) 
• Extreme Assortment: only C with C; D with D
o eC = N-1; eD = 0  (C increase if b>c>0)
N
bec
N
b
N
be DC >⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+ 1−>− b
cNee DC
– Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009. Proceedings B
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Claim (Hypothesis)
• “True” altruism only evolves via 
inclusive fitness (kin selection)
• "Direct benefits explain mutually 
beneficial cooperation, whereas indirect 
benefits explain altruistic cooperation”
o West et al. 2007, JEB.
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Inclusive Fitness Concept
• wdirect(A) = wbaseline – c
• windirect(A) = rb
• winclusive(A) = wdirect(A) + windirect(A)  
• winclusive(A) = wbaseline – c + rb
• Hamilton’s rule: rb – c > 0
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Defining Altruism
• “Altruism: a behaviour which is costly to the actor and 
beneficial to the recipient...”
• “A general point here is that altruism is defined: (i) 
with respect to the lifetime consequences of a 
behaviour; (ii) on absolute fitness effects (i.e. does it 
increase or decrease the actor’s fitness, and not 
relative to just some subset of the population).”
• “For example, if a cooperative behaviour was costly 
in the short term, but provided some long-term 
(future) benefit, which outweighed that, it would be 
mutually beneficial and not altruistic.”
o West et al. JEB 2007
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Issues in Defining Altruism
• Distribution of behaviours across 
population
o All individuals both givers and receivers 
• lifetime cost means altruism cannot evolve
o Strict separation of givers and receivers 
• (e.g. suicidal aid, sterility)
• phenotype defines altruism; but analysis in 
terms of genotype frequency (which is the 
same)
o What qualifies as an altruistic genotype? 
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Where to Draw the Hierarchal Line?
• What constitutes a “lifetime cost” of a 
behaviour?
• What are the assumptions about 
individual influence on interaction 
structure?
• Is it OK that individuals become true 
altruists or not depending on their 
context (which they do not perceive or 
control)?
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Simple Iterated PD Model
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The Role of Models in Science?
• Is the claim a falsifiable hypothesis?
• What model could test this hypothesis? 
• Models are simplifications
o We choose what is in and out
o Want to capture just what is essential
• Empiricists are more advanced in 
guarding against biases
• Need to learn and use each others’
models
31
Conclusion
• Various theories of the evolution of altruism 
rely on the same underlying requirement for 
sufficient assortment between the genotype 
in question and help from others
• This is captured in Queller’s version of 
Hamilton’s rule and the notion of interaction 
environments
• Inclusive fitness is an accounting method, not 
a fundamental mechanism
• Testable Hypothesis: true altruism can evolve 
without interactions among kin (or genetically 
similar individuals)
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